New Zealand policymakers have to date paid scant attention to the disclosure of financial information to employees and unions. However, there are signs this could change. Current trends under the Employment Contracts Act towards enterprise and productivity bargaining may well see access to financial information emerge as a domain of increasing interest , and significance. The Labour Party's policies for industrial relations reform incorporate proposals for a good faith bargaining requirement, including a statutory duty to supply relevant information. Should any future government contemplate action on industrial democracy, this would also have implications for disclosure.
Disclosure in the context of the labour market, on the other hand, remains a purely voluntary affair. New Zealand and Australian ẽmployers are under no statutory duty to provide financial infottnation to employẽes or their representatives for collective bargaining or any other purposes. Companies legislation in New Zealand has recently been subject to a major review exercise. However, no amendments were included in the Companies Act 1993 or in the new Financial Reporting Act 1993 that would change this situation. The interests of the suppliers of financial capital remain the only ones deemed worthy of statutory protection 1 • Similarly, the issue of infottnation rights appears to have eluded drafters of the Employment Contracts Act 1991.
The suggestion is sometimes made that labour interests can simply "make do" by relying on the statutory reports produced for shareholders 2 . There are three major difficulties with this:
(a) l 2 3 It totally overlooks that the majority of employees are employed by companies that do not raise debt and equity funds from the public 3 . Non-public issuers must still prepare financial statements but , are not required to disclose publicly any inforrnation relating to their finances and may dispense with an audit if all shareholders agree. In addition, under the Financial Reporting Act 1993, "exempt" companies (those with assets not exceeding Indeed the whole issue of employee rights in gẽneral and the accountability of companies to the public was conspicuous by its absence. Some measure of lack of interest can be gauged from the NZ Law Commission's preliminary discussion paper on company law refonn (NZ Law Commission, 1987) , in which one paragraph (para.40) was devoted to the duties of a company to its employees and the public at large. The Commission recommended that a requirement under the old Companies Act (s.l33) for public companies to file a copy of their financial statements with the Companies Office for public inspection (which presumably did imply some notion of a broader accountability) be discontinued on the grounds that "the costs exceeded the benefits". The Commission found it "difficult to discern any independent public interest" in disclosure "beyond identification of the company and its rẽsponsible officers" (para.l25). (In the event, s.l8 of the Financial Reporting Act 1993 still requires public disclosure of the accounts of publicly listed companies). The writer understands that the NZ Council of Trade Unions (NZCTU) did make an approach to the Law Commission with the aim, inter alia, of raising the issue of disclosure rights for workers but was informed that the Commission regarded that as a matter for labour law not company law (a similar reaction to that received by the United Kingdom union movement 30 yẽars ago). In its 1989 Report on the reforms, the Commission reiterates its view that "a Companies Act is not the appropriate vehicle for imposition of general social reforms" (NZ Law Commission, 1989: para.l9 ). and not Sl otillion) are not to with BxemptioDB from all or part of partic11ler are also available to ce~tain other non-publie issuers under the NZ Society of ' for Dljferential Reporting. This framework sdll fUrther the on shareholder needs, with the "separation of owners and govaning bodies" providing one of the three criteria for detern1ining whether a company may claim exemptions.
Listed companies typically comprise complex of subsidiaries and subsubsidiaries. In these situations, consolidated accounts are prepared which present the results and financial position of the group of companies as though it was a single ente1prise. Thus, for example, the annual reports of Fletcher Challenge Ltd incorporate, 1rt1er IlliG, the results of Crown Forest, Fletcher Construction and Petrocorp. · &QJUnta are useful to labour interests, for example, as a measure of a group's ability to • losses in a particular area. At the same time, because they contain very aeneml they are usually of limited value in answering about an :-..a:. • ~. I . ba • .
• lndi .dual subsid. . do .
ua~~VIud" entaprure orrgatn1ng •m•t V l l a n e s continue to prepare tbllr own accounts. However the bulk of subsidiaries controlled by listed are not public issuers and their accounts are not fteely available.
Even leaving aside acaa difficulties, the interests and priorities of capital and labour and bencA-: tlurir inforanation needs differ. The argument that workers need, or indeed have a right to, financial info1•nation rests on a pluralist conception of organisations and centles around three main themes: sbengthening managerial accountability, wage bargaining and industrial democracy initiatives (for further background and detailed discussion of these points, Brown, 1992) . From labour's point of view, profit is not a sufficient expression of the success of an enterprise. Corporate reports rarely contain substantive infoltfiation relating to the workforce, for example, on such matters as labour productivity, the range of incomes, fringe benefits, superannuation contributions, maintenance of entployee purchasing power, bansfer pricing policies, lev;els and locations of employment, skills baining or health and safety records. Moves towards a broader set of perfo1•nance measures in annual reports could help to secure increased accountability of management to et11ployees and various other non-shareholder constituencies. External reporting also offers the advantage of building up a systematic public record for analysis and comparison (Owen and Harte, 1984) . However, such reports are never likely to be timely nor ~· enough for wage contract or other bargaining purposes. The needs of agents are in many respects more akin to those of bankers or Inland Revenue who rely on special purpose financial reports. the 1970s a number of companies in New Zealand have adopted a practice of preparing annual reports for employees (Smith, 1985) . However, in the absence of specific requirements or agreed accounting standards, companies are free to decide for the most appropriate fo1·m and content of these reports. In practice, they typically 236 Judy Brown contain only very simplified financial inforrnation and rarely allow for any meaningful analy · They have the added drawback of being unaudited so that users are provided with little ~ w ...... &~ about the credibility of the infortnation being reported. The NZCTU (1989: 17) understandabl regards such reports as owing more to a "corporate relations gimmick" than to genuine ~of "infortnation sharing or participation".
During the late 1980s/early 1990s recessionary economic conditions and moves toward --f'A,'"" .... bargaining also saw employers drawing attention to their financial situation to justify redundancies, closures and lower wage settlements:
The Christchurch Star, which slashed its workforce by 40 percent yesterday, was losing $350,000 a month, the daily evening newspaper's chainnan, David Stock, said (Dominion, 21 November 1990) .
Workers at James Smiths in Lower Hutt have been told this week the store will close ... Staff were given no warning of the closure and were stunned to hear about it on Tuesday. They were told the "auditor said it's best", she said (Redundant worker, Dominion, 19 March 1992) .
Employees squeezing their employers into expensive (wage) settlements will find that those settlements impact on the competitive position of the employer -jeopardising their own job security. The driving force for employers had to be their financial position ... (NZ Employers Federation chief executive Steve Marshall, Dominion, 23 July 1992).
Unions were frequently criticised for attempting to make wage settlements without sufficient regard to the economic consequences for the undertaking. The NZEF (1989: 15) wanted industrial relations to "become more a matter of the economic concerns of employer and employee and the organisation in which they are both concerned" and to be "conducted in a more rational and harmonious way". The NZ Business Roundtable (1989: 2) endorsed such an approach and observed that in "good employment relationships" employees would be "fairly rewarded for their efforts". Assuming (somewhat optimistically) that employees and labour representatives agree that a "fair" reward is one which results from the "free play" of market forces and contracts based on the financial circumstances of the individual firrn, it is difficult to see how "rational" workplace bargaining can take place or how employees can judge whether they have been "fairly rewarded" without their having rights of access to financial inforrnation. It seems both unrealistic and unreasonable to expect one party to bargain from a position of ignorance. Moreover to suggest, as the NZEF (1989: 17) did, that the recovery of the New Zealand economy depended upon profits being appropriated for "capital forrnation" rather than "wages or conditions" was implicitly asking workers for some fottn of investment which, even on the narrowest view, presumably entitled them to be treated as "owners" with infottnation rights.
With corporate profits on the rebound, employers seem less enthusiastic about admitting ability to pay considerations into wage bargaining. In early 1994, the NZCTU queried where "the workers' share of the economic recovery was" after statistics indicated that average hourly pay rates barely moved in the previous year (NZ Herald, 24 February 1994) . NZCTU President Ken WBF with profit by for perceat Ia the final of 1993), Air NZ (up 4S percatt ill the lilt half ..S INL (up 32 percent for the half year). The following day Telecom annotmced that it to ~ workers' claims" but believed that "pay rises on the basis of inflation, profit or were "out of date" (NZ Herald, 25 Feb1uary 1994) . The now to be for more individually forms of "merit pay". the 1990s interest in "employee communications" programmes has also been evident with of ideas propounded by HRM theorists (Townley, 1989; Storey, 1992) . Some have established workplace consulta~ve committees and undertaken to provide info1n1ation" to facilitate consultation between management and labour. However, ~ it seems that the decision as to what constitutes "relevant information" still lies primarily aad dle.re will be Httle representatives can do if a reftlaea tD wl I D7. This nwy in any Labour-led coalition The for relations refotm incolporates proposals for the int•oduction rccpJitaJJent, including a statutory duty to provide relevant to the Rt Hon. Helen Clark, it is envisaged that reqni•c•rcatts t I L n and provision made for the swift resolution of di&pdtes as to available to the parties" (Clark, 1993: 158) . Should Labour to die • of its 1988 Committee of Inquiry into Industrial , this wouklalso bave implications for disclosure (see Report of the Cll11, 1989: 30etrective worker participation inevitably requires access to internal management accounting however, disclosure to unions and employees in New Zealand and Austlalia remains a matter of prerogative or, at best, the subject of private contlacting between and anployee groups. This "voluntarist" approach is in marked contrast to the situation exists in the United States, United Kingdom and throughout Europe where labour law duties on employers to supply worker representatives with a range of both general and purpose financial inforanation.
States bas no statutes dealing directly with the disclosure of inforanation to employees However, the National Labor Relations Act 1935 (NLRA) imposes on and 1mions a duty to · in good faith. Case law, evolving since the mid-1930s, luis tbat this requirement gives unions the right to request from employers info1naation wbich is "relevant and to mtmdatory subjects of bargaining (wages, hours and other and conditioas of mnploym.ent). A United Kingdom Commission of Industrial Relations (1972: 37) noted that the underlying philosophy is that: to comparative earnings data for other groups of workers is al8o of bargaining over fringe benefits has also given unions access to operation of health insurance and pension schemes.
The phrase "relevant and necessary" has been interpreted more with J.'fJII*4 of the employer's profits and other aspects of its financial situation. In NLIJI Manufacturing Co. ( 1956) the Supreme Court confirmed that as a general a cannot argue "inability to pay" to counter a union demand, and then refuse to 8UPP1J info1anation to substantiate its claim. The Court stated that if an inahjJity te pay important enough to present . . . it is important enough to require some-101t of accuracy". This decision has been extended to cases where employers economic conditions dictate their position. In Cincinnati Cordage and Paper Co. (1963) , NLRB held that the company's contention that it could not pay a wage increase-.\ competitive" was tantamount to a claim of "inability to pay" and that the Truitt rule rep1 provision of substantiating information applied. 4
The ruling in Truitt has given unions access to breakdowns of ""* wages, raw materials, salaries, depreciation, and overheads and to · aho1lt and outgoing orders. However, in the absence of financial inability or a no presumptive right of access to such information. The employer must concur b I • pay is accepted as a relevant consideration. Thus where rejection of a wap is unwillingness rather than inability to pay there is no obligation to disclose, a regard as grossly inequitable:
. . . companies that are unprofitable and financially weak are often quick to di•lole all lhe pertinent infonnation since it helps their cause. Financially Sbong companies, however, do aat ory poverty or an inability to meet the union's demands and thereby escape the obligation to Gpllldllir books (union official cited in Jain, 1981: 756). Disclosure rights apply to the administlation of existing contracts as well as to of future agreements. Information supplied must allow the bargaining agent to "UDdt • . ' .. ·, .,... ~ • ,_ r • , discuss intelligently" the issues raised in bargaining. It must be made available 4 It should be noted that a simple disinclination to pay does not result in an obligation to infonnation.
... Dll
Dilelosure of 239 wbich is reasonably useful and "not so burdensome or time consnnling as to impede the of · " (Old Line Lifo Insurance Co. 195 1) although not necessarily in the form by the union.
are not entifted to demand disclosure of information related to pennissive subjects of &&&&&.loA (those over which parties may but do not have to bargain). This constraint flows from · acceptance of capital and managerial prerogatives and means unions are generally unable review sbategic management accounting information. Issues relating to the long-te1111 planning the enterprise -capital investlttent plans, plant location, product diversification, and so onare dunted to impinge only indirectly on the employment relationship and are, therefore, not .-ndatory subjects of bargaining. Similarly, decisions to close all or part of a company are not subject to mandatory bargaining because such decisions are held to lie "at the core of control" (Fibreboard Paper Products Ltd v NLRB 1964) . That the employment .,&1111 of such decisions often lie "at the core of worlcer and union concern" appears by and to be ignored:
Decilioas to continue subcontracting, to close one of several plants, to build a new plant, to liquidate to sell part or all of the enterprise, or to become part of a conglomaate are all decisi0111 which may be more important to the employees than wages or hours of work. Neveatheless. the courts have held that the employees have no right to be notified, no right to and no right to use their concerted efforts to affect these types of decisions. The impact on the employees' livelihoods and their futures may be far greater than the impact on the stoclcholden or management, but employees have no voice. They do not even have a right to know the business facts on which the decision was based; they are told only of the consequences which they must bear because of a unilateral management decision (Summers cited in Atleson, 1983: 6-7) .
NLRB has also noted that decisions "in which a significant investntent or withdrawal of will affect the scope and ultimate direction of the enterprise" are matters "essentially and managerial in nature" and involve "subject areas as to which detenninative financial operaboD&I considerations are likely to be unfamiliar to the employees and their · (Atleson, 1983 : 130-1, emphasis added). The implicit assumption is that unions DOt only "too ill-equipped to deal with such complex and weighty matters" (ibid: 131) but that • decisions are essentially technical matters best left to the "experts". unployer may refuse to disclose "relevant and necessary" info11nation on the grounds of ....,..· confidentiality or the need to protect individual privacy. In International ODtlworara "NLRB (1959) the Court of Appeal refused union access to production and sales · on the grounds that its release might have a detrimental effect on the competitive of the co•nployer. Since the 1979 Supreme Court decision in Detroit Edison, the NLRB the position that an employer's interest in refusing to disclose on confidentiality be "legitimate and substantial". The employer must also make a "good faith" effort provide the tmion with the data required in an alternative forn1 designed to protect the s while at the same time meeting the union's needs.
Judy Brown
A disclosure request can also be refused on the grounds that the union's request is motivated solely by a desire to harass management or that the employer would have to go to "unreasonable" lengths to comply with the union's request (Whitin Machine Works 1955) . For example, if the company does not nortnally prepare quarterly or half-yearly reports it is not obliged to start doing so (McLean-Arkansas Lumber Co. 1954) .
While employers may be required to produce certain inforntation, they may do so in specially prepared, unaudited reports. The union has no automatic right to inspect original documents or to appoint its own auditor (Jacobs Manufacturing Co. 1951) . This is in marked contrast to the situation of the auditor acting on behalf of shareholders who has rights to examine all original documents. Where rights of access to original documentation are granted, the employer may insist that the accountant not be in the union's general employ (Yakima Frozen Foods 1961) .
Given the inability to subject employer submissions to independent analysis, it is perhaps not surprising that some unionists remain wary of active participation in financial disclosure. Union representatives surveyed by Palmer ( 1977: 32-3) complained that inforntation was often not forthcoming without an NLRB "unfair practices" threat and that "often the clarity, format, usefulness and reliability of the infottnation were poor". The most frequently mentioned specific criticisms related to "incomplete infortnation, selective disclosure of results and deceptive practices in accounting". The union representatives expressed a strong preference for the availability of financial inforntation that was "independently audited ... provided on an ongoing basis rather than only at contract bargaining time" and provided "non-selectively" in years of high and low profitability.
If an employer refuses to disclose inforntation, the union has a right to file a complaint with the NLRB alleging that the employer is guilty of an unfair labour practice. Rulings of the Board do not carry the force of law and, if not accepted, must be advanced through the court system. Although the limits have been drawn tightly, United States employers are reported to regard the NLRB's general posture on disclosure as an invasion of managerial prerogatives (Foley and Maunders, 1977: 4) . Unions have complained that employers fail "to meet even limited NLRB disclosure requirements" and that they are unable to correct this situation due to the time required to process an NLRB complaint (Palmer, 1977: 33) .
United Kingdom
Compared with the situation in the United States and in Europe, the regulated disclosure of infottnation to labour representatives in the United Kingdom is a relatively recent phenomenon. Statutory provisions were first introduced in the Industrial Relations Bill just before the Labour Government left office in 1970. Very similar provisions were subsequently enacted by the Conservative Government in the Industrial Relations Act 1971 but never became operative before they were repealed by the Trade Unions and Labour Relations Act 1974. The current law on disclosure is as set out in the Employment Protection Act introduced by the Labour Government Section 181 of the TULRCA imposes a duty on employers at all stages of collective bargaining ~ to disclose to recognised trade union representatives, on request, inforn1ation:
without which the trade union representatives would be to a material extent impeded in carrying on ... collective bargaining, and infonnation which it would be in accordance with good industrial relations practice (to disclose) for the purposes of collective bargaining.
The TULRCA imposes no obligation to disclose any specific item of infortnation. However, the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) has issued a Code of Practice which lists items which might be rẽlevant to collective bargaining . . This includes reference to pay and fringẽ benefits, non-wage labour costs, savings from increased productivity, sales and order book situation, cost structures, gross and net profits, sources of earnings, assets, liabilities, allocation of profits, government financial assistancẽ, transfer prices, intra-group loans and interest charged.
These obligations are, however, limited in various ways under Section 182 of the TULRCA. The employer may refuse to disclose information on the grounds that disclosure would cause "substantial injury" to the firm (for rẽasons other than its effect on collective bargaining) or that it would involve work or expense out of "reasonable proportion" to its value in collective bargaining. The ACAS Code of Practice envisages that the "'substantial injury" exemption might cover situations involving a potential loss of customers to competitors, the withholding of materials by suppliers or the impairment of the ability to raise business finance. Examples of infottnation which might cause substantial injury in these circumstances are given as follows: cost infortnation on individual products, detailed analyses of proposed investments, marketing or pricing policies and the make-up of tender prices.
The employer may also refuse to disclose infortnation on the grounds that it would be against the interests of national security, would contravẽne an Act of Parliament, was given to the employer in confidence, relates to an individual and consent has not been given to its disclosure or w, as obtained for use in legal proceedings.
As in the United States, thẽ employer is under no obligation to produce, or allow inspection of, any document other than the one specifically preparẽd for the purpose of providing the infot tnation.
If an employer refuses to disclose inforn1ation, the union has a right of appeal to the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC). The CAC may refer the matter to the ACAS for conciliation. If this fails, the matter must go to a full, fortnal hearing. A ruling is then made specifying what, if anything, the employer is required to disclose, and when. If an employer ignores a CAC ruling, the union may present a further complaint to the CAC. If the further complaint is upheld, the 1Jnion can ask the CAC to 81l for each of the individual
In practice, unions have made only limited use of 1980; Gospel and Willman, 1981; Jackson-Cox et al., 1987) . Tile used in the first 16 months of its operation, with 74 references to the CAC.
the number fell to 38 and this bend has continued with the..._._.
rarely exceeding 20 (lnduslrial Relations Review and Report, 199!). A reasons have been offered for this: lack of or cynici••1 about die satisfaction with current disclosure levels, disenchantment with the leaislalioa 8lld the effective use of infor•Dation by unions. IDes appear to be consistent with evidence of union enthtJsia•n for the concept of information disclosure (Trades Union Congress 1974; 1977; 1987) . The rue (1971), example, recommends that union representatives make use of the find out about invesbnent and other company plans and to ag•eements with managements. During the 1970s, the union movement number of suggestions for improvements in financial methods aacl supported such practices as "value-added reporting" 5 • However Hussey and point to the lack of tradition in the United Kingdom of · collective on the basis of detailed fmancial, production and manpower inforauation. They obaeNI that new styles of "infol'llled bargaining", however sbongly supported at head oftice, 111111 be far from easy to impress on the rank and file. Given that the United economy has been in a state of recession for most of the past 1 S years, there "IIY bave also been an understandable disinclination on the part of 1mions to actively "bad news". Fears of managerial incorporation, the absence of to woatplace democracy, scepticism about the credibility and impartiality of "managen1ent's facts and figures" and doubts about the independence of the accounting profession may also contribute to an "ostrich approach" to inforntation disclosure (Brown, 1992) .
Satisfaction with cu"ent disclosure levels -unions may already have to all the information they believe they need. There is some evidence that the passing of legislation has encouraged companies to adopt more open disclosure policies, without tmions baving Value-added reporting was quite widespread in the United Kingdom in the 1970s (for detailed see Burchell et al., 1985) . "Value added" represents a broader concept of "income" thn "profit" aa.d is arguably more in keeping with a "stakeholder" theory of the corporation. It takes items like waps and salaries out of the category of costs (which on the face of it are desirable to minimise) and them as a share in the net proceeds of the enterprise. In practice, employen often used these statements to emphasise co-operation and team work in the creation of wealth but, from a pluralist fiame of reference, they also offer the advantage of making distributions and re-distributions of wealth within the enterprise more transparent.
NC08r81 to the CAC 1910).
by toaether with tbat obtained from aourcea (tle lllCidia, ~ may be regarded by 1mions as sufficient for their Dair and (1979) . for example, report a study of shop stewards who stated 1hey were · · and "could think of · more to ask beyond wl It wu being provided by (p.2S). Of course such professed may not so much point to the adequacy of infor•nation levels but rather the capacity of shop stewards to identify the specific inforn.-.ation which is (or could be) awilable and which could be of use. · in order to CIIIY out a monitoring role with to the of pay systems and job giading schemes (Industrial Relations Review aad ~ 1992). However, in general, employers have been quite successful in limiting the t1ow of inforn1ation on the basis of the exemptions provided.
Many
have objected successfully to disclosures on the grounds of an absence of "material impediment". This bas, for example, proved a particular obstacle to unions seeking infoitnation they have managed without in the past. Where unions are as having alte1native means of obtaining the info11nation sought from employers, it bas also been held that they are not materially impeded (Clydesdale Bank Ltd and the Association of Sciel'llijic, Technical and Managerial Staffs, 1978) .
The issue of what constitutes "good industrial relations practice" bas also caused difficulty. The CAC does not see its brief in this area in terms of setting new disclosure standards:
We feel that although we may adopt the broad principle that the more information that is the better for industrial relations, it is not for us to map out wholly new approaches to collective bargaining. We are not neces.vrily to seek a type of "genetal level" of bargaining practice. We are possibly entitled to take the best. We are not, we thillk, entided to take one that does not exist, declare it good and enforce it (Standard Telephones and Cables and ASTMS, 1979) . At the same time, the CAC concedes that attempts to articulate a "good industrial relations" standard based on "best practices" have been somewhat hampered by the weak consensus on the issue: "infol'lnation which is commonly disclosed in one sector of industry may be 1978).
aa a lliiiiiY
The CAC does appear to take the view tll8t if it reveals or confirms coDflicts of Journalists ( 1978) the CAC that a giving of info1Jnation between combatallt parties...., In that case disclosure was in such a excuse for a hostile reaction". In Sttmt:lortl Telep,_.., Committee denied union representatives acoesa to grounds that "such disclosure would actually be of atdt'e".
The "substantial injury" cla11se has also been widely. ta on segment data, itemised costs, policies aad plant elea&Na on these grounds. Airwork Services and of (1978) concerned a union for info1•nation about the profits of England and Scotland. The union submitted that the --· it to make a wage claim on the company's profitability aad hlily PIJ at the airfields was awarded through a tendering system and the CAC llt1cl dl8t was likely to severely jeopardise the company's clvmcfa of rcnewiag fall into the hands of a competitor. An on the part of the confidentiality was rejected on the grounds that such would IJe maintain. In Hoover Ltd and General and Municipal Worlrera' Union (1919) , lilt agreed that info1n1ation concetning the company's in'¥ ent policies. the production, product line sales, operating costs and was "highhy relevant" to collective bargaining. However, because the infmn,atioa was elao ef sensitive, commercial nature the employer was not obliged to • it.
Unions have also experienced difficulties with employers supplyiDg 8JMI aggregated information and/or claiming that info1•n•tion ia "not When approached by unions requesting details of its cost structures in support of 1978 wage claim the Ford motor company responded that 68 percent of ita C08II to "materials and services" and that a breakdown of this figure was "not et al., 1979: 18) .
The ACAS Code has also been criticised for not attempting to list basic im•ns should be disclosed in all circumstances and for omitting impottant ite•ns, prospective, organisational and international · (ibid: 21). In the early 1 the ACAS explored the possibility of revising the Code but decided that "the divergent views that their preliminary consultations had revealed meant that it would premature to proceed with the revision at that time" 19&7: 198 TUC-Labour Party Liaison Committee (1982) notes that any legislation on· 11111 will have to be accompanied by further on disclosure in order to 1Jiw uoious access to info1mation concerning policy and stlategy decisions.
n.
cost" clause places unions in the difficult position of having to cleJ the value of info1mation without having it. As Foley and 19TI: 18) it is exbemely difficult to define ex ante what the value of information wiD be. Nor is the question of what is an "unreasonable" amount of work or cost iavolved in making info1anation available self-evident (Marsh and Rosewell, 1976) . Unreasonable by whose criteria? The costs of preparing info1n1ation should generally be quite low since much of the information would, in any case, be available for internal management purposes.
As in the United States, there have been complaints about the lack of access to original documents. The CAC itself appears to feel uncomfortable with the Act's provisions in this respect. In one case it said that notwithstanding that it felt unable to award access to company records "it would be hard to deny the moral and customary right of the ('•nion) to the information required" (Greater London Council and GLC Staff Association and the Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians 1979) .
Unions have also complained that the remedies available against employers who refuse to provide info1111ation are inadequate (General and Municipal Workers Union, 1978) . The complaints procedure is cumbersome and provides employers with plenty of opportunities for procrastination. Unions going through the full procedure face a lengthy waiting period, by which time the infor1nation may be i11elevant. Penalty clauses are far from onerous. At worst, a non-complying employer is faced with possible legal action on an implied term of contract. The CAC has also expressed disquiet at the enforcement machinery. In one case where the employer had not complied with a disclosure ruling, the CAC felt unable to include the information in individual employment contracts: "We were presented with something of a problem as there can be important differences between information necessary for effective collective bargaining and information suitable Disclosure legislation -a move towards pluralism?
In the United Kingdom and United States, the primary emphasis baa bela oa purposes of collective bargaining. NLRA and TULRCA acceptance of a pluralist perspective; there is recognition of a management and labour which needs to be negotiated and from the above review, nnitarist reasoning is evident in many of 1he jacliclal
Decisions have by and large reinforced notions of au.d caplal a lilllt courts have been reluctant to substitute their own judgments for to endorse the "best" practices of employers. Managers are strategic decisions without notification or consultation (either as of their technical expertise). Where info11nation rights are 81 i control over the infor1nation that is to be collected and may dte for•, ia ..ttlch it is presented. There is a reluctance to enforce disclosure of information whioh or atafirms conflicts of interest. Unions are not trusted to preserve confidentiality. As a rights have not been extended as far as might originally have 111e approach to disclosure, by contrast, reflects a more explicit pluralist "stakeholder" with greater commitment to the philosophy of worker rights to consultation and participation iD the management of organisations. Europe t .,., ; t Works council schemes with statutory provisions for disclosure have in most European countries since the 1940s (British Institute of Management, 1957) . This section foousea on the disclosure rights of Belgium works council representatives (Blanpain, 1992; National Consultative Council 1988) which are specified in greater detail than in manl other Hm~ countries. However, broadly similar rights are conferred by law in Austria, France, Omuumy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (ibid). \Wdcs co1mcils are mandatory in all eaterpriaea at 100 S•acb C<nJncils, of e1nployee and up to ID ~ber of must have at least four employee members in with 100 to 22 members in undel~takings with more than 8,000
Under a 1973 Royal the employer is obliged to provide works council members with sufficient fiaancial and · to give them "a clear and accurate" view of the 1•ndcr11akiag and the legal, and fin•ocial entities of which it is a part. Where the · comprises ~&& centres, relevant inforntation must also be provided with respect to sub-units. disclosures comprise four major categories: basic infornUttion, annual infoln,ation, infor11Jation and occasional information. Any documents given to shareholders must also provided to works council members.
BIBle
detailed info1111ation must be given to works couucil ben within two aonths of their election or re-election on the legal status of the its ..... ve position, production and productivity levels, financial slructnre, budgets and coat labour costs, investment plans and future prospects, research : ~ : I ; financial assistance and basic organisational structure.
A1111ual information -within three months of the end of the fiMncial and before the general meeting of shareholders, information must be given on financial results for the past year, the utilisation of tax and financial incentives, a comparative analysis of objectives and achievements, economic and financial objectives for the coming year and future profit and employment prospects. Balance sheet and profit and loss account infor1nation must be compared with results from the two previous years and an analysis provided of changes in capital, reserves, debt levels, fixed and current depreciation taken, income and expenditure levels, profit distributions and managerial and nonmanagerial remuneration. Detailed explanation of any changes in accounting policy must also be supplied.
Periodic information -information must be supplied at least every three months on sales forecasts, order-book situation, costs, price changes, stock levels, productivity and employment, the use being made of any state aid received, budgetary control and the meeting of objectives. This infotntation is intended to enable works council members to make a judgement on the attainment of organisational objectives and must be in a fo1m which enables proper comparisons with basic and annual info11nation.
(d)
Occasional information-whenever events occur or internal decisions are being taken that could have "major implications" for the undertaking, infot111ation relating to the expected effects on the undertaking's activities and the employee's situation is to be supplied. Information should, wherever possible, be communicated before decisions take effect.
The Royal Order emphasises that information supplied to works council members must be the "occasion of an exchange of views". Members have the right to "ask for additional inforiMtion, Auditors are to to tho certify the "truth and completeaess" of dle Experts can also be invited to d works 001moil
The other party has the right to refuse the expe1t but IIIIJ aot a pe1 iod. If persists, there is a risht of to Employee representatives are also entitled to attend on full pay for the purpose of developing their own ex1 Employers can avoid certain specified categories of disclosures on the unde1·taking" but few companies are reported to do so (Hilton, 1978) . Suell subject to prior approval by the of Commeroe. Bmployee are assigned the task of info1•ning staff of the undertaking on the baals of communicated to them "taking care to use it with all the discretion to undettaldng's interests".
• Concern has been expressed about the level of compliance with the p1ovisioBS of Decree. Jain (1978) , for example, reports a survey which found that about one ball of the ........ I surveyed provided the necessary inforruation and "two-thirds of the re•aainder were technical grounds: inadequate documentation, late · no Nonetheless, European disclosure practices are well ahead of those in the ~ United States.
European unions also have extended rights of access to info1•nation and oppom1nities to ......... the external fmancial reporting process through the two-tier system of company boards. Geiinany, for example, the supervisory board (Aufsichtsral), which the course business and which includes both employee and union representatives (on cabtin industly size criteria), approves the annual reports and examines board of management proposals for the appropriation of profits. Any member of the supervisory board can at aay time, inforrnation on affairs of importance for the enterprise. The management board has a sbltotory duty to meet such requests.
European union
In 1980 the European Commission issued a draft Directive -the "Vredeling" Directiveto more clearly define employee rights to info1mation and consultation in with complex structures, in particular multinational enterprises. The Directive proved .... .. ,...,.~ controversial and was amended substantially in an attempt to get the support of both and labour interests in various member countries. Negotiations over the establishment of EWCs or other procedures may be initiated by maugement or at the request of 100 employees or their representatives. This involves the establishment of a "special negotiating body" (SNB), made up of employee representatives, which is to negotiate an agreement with management. Unless the SNB decides (by a two-thirds majority) not to initiate or continue negotiations, this process must result in an agreement on an EWC or other procedure within three years of the request for negotiations. If not, or if management refuses to commence negotiations, a mininm set of info11nation and consultation requirements (refer1ed to as the "subsidiary requirements") applies. The Directive does not apply to groups and unde1taldngs where, by September 1996, '~ere is already an agreement, covering the entire workforce, providing for the transnational information and consultation of employees".
Subsidiary requirements -the subsidiary requirements, which apply where management and workers cannot reach a voluntary agreement, require the establishment of an EWC and set out a number of rules on its competence, composition and operation. At least once a year, the EWC has the right to meet with central management, to be informed and consulted on the progress of the organisation's business and its prospects. Information
For further details on the Directive's background and an analysis of the major differences between the BWC proposals and "Vredeling", see European Industrial Relations Review (BIRR, 1991; 1994&, band c 250 Judy Brown must refer to: the organisation's structure; its economic and .. &&I probable development of the business and of production and the emp situation and probable trends; invesbnents and substantial changes concerning ..... (including the introduction of new work methods or production processes, flansfers of production, mergers, cut-backs or closures and collective redundancies).
Where there are "exceptional circumstances" affecting the employees' interests to "a considerable extent" -particularly in the event of relocations, closures or collective redundancies -employee representatives have the right to meet management with a view to being infor1ned and consulted on any measures significantly affecting employees' interests. The meeting must be timely and be based on a report from management on which the EWC may give an opinion. It is stressed, however, that the meeting will not affect the prerogatives of central management.
The operating expenses of the EWC are to be met by central management, which must provide members with the financial and material resources necessary for them to ca11Y out their duties appropriately. The EWC may also be assisted by experts of its choice, insofar as this is necessary for it to carry out its tasks. Member states may lay down budgetary rules regarding the operation of the EWC and, in particular, limit funding to cover one expert only.
(c) Confidential informationcentral management is not obliged to transmit information if this would "seriously harm" or prejudice the undertaking concerned. However, these confidentiality exemptions are only to apply in specific cases and under conditions and limits laid down by national legislation. Member states may also make such dispensation subject to prior administrative or judicial authorisation.
(d)
Disputes and enforcementmember states are to provide for "appropriate measures" in the event of failure to comply with the Directive. In particular, adequate adminisbative or judicial procedures must be available to enable obligations derived from the Directive to be enforced. Where member states allow management to restrict or withhold infor1nation on confidentiality grounds, they must ensure administrative or judicial appeal procedures are available to employees.
The Directive's proposals have been the subject of considerable debate between the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and European private sector employers (see, for example, Pipkom, 1983; Hussey, 1984 and EIRR, 1991) . ETUC favours greater transparency of multinational activities through mandatory, legal procedures for the disclosure of information. It has expressed concern at the "watering down" of the Directive through various modifications to the original draft and is also concerned about the issue of enforcement. Employer interest groups, on the other hand, argue that mandatory procedures would be unworkable for the separate member states, present a threat to managerial prerogatives, create problems regarding the confidential nature of infot·tnation and take no account of "economic necessities". United tile · 's impl lation dle ber of ap •
• worken stood at approxill18tely 100 ( more 1 1 100 virtually all the countries bad taken steps to implem.cmt the COIJecliYC '8'CCIDCDts between central 
bas been
with the aisthlll U'liilld and throughout Europe. In the United rights to ad arise out of the employer's statutory duty to in good faith. In the are obliged to disclose infoJtMtiOD without which would be materially impeded from canying out theh\ collective duties 1lldch it would be in accordance with "good industrial relations practice" to · .,."' ~~ provisions at national and Coanmuaity level duties OD works councils and worker on with a any system will be firmly embedded in the socio-political of the aad may not tlaoslate easily. Nonetheless, labour in all CO'•ntries fll die same concerns, for example, about acco1•ntability, the abiHty in 811 manner, the importance of consultation and in that them and monitoring the efficiency and equity of · decision-making. the Employment Contracts Act towards entaprise and procbiCtivity provide oae of the more obvious starting points for unions and others interested in disclosure practice in New Zealand. The issue of inforrnation rights also 252 Judy Brown high priority on any agenda reform". In eidl•-. e-.-provides a useful reference base. Some valuable leasous may also be drawa experiences concerning the importance of ensuring ~ legislative or not so widely drawn as to allow determined entployers to to disclose provide disclosure only when it suits them), the need for if representatives are to be in a position to use infor•nation effectively, the impo1fance of their able to gain some assurance about the credibility of the data supplied and the need for enforcement machinery. The review of United States and United Kingdom legislation also highlights the significance of judicial decision-making and the potential for judges to subve1t or at least reduce the impact of pluralist provisions through the (conscious or unconscious) application of unitarist reasoning to issues of interpretation.
